6. A Policy of Mandatory Sentencing for Dangerous Offenders: Lessons from England and Wales: Paul Gavin
- Last Updated on Tuesday, 18 September 2012 08:37
- Paul Gavin
In January 2012 the Law Reform Commission published its consultation paper on mandatory sentencing, recommending that current minimum sentence law for drugs offences be reviewed because it has led to a bulge in the prison population without affecting those at the top of the drugs industry. This paper is based on a presentation given at the 7th North South Irish Criminology Conference in 2011 and it provides a view from England and Wales, where mandatory sentencing provisions have been in place for dangerous offenders since the 1990’s, but specifically since the passing of the Criminal Justice Act (2003). It examines the definitions of dangerous and dangerousness and argues that any sentencing policy based on the notion of dangerousness is rooted in moral and criminological ambiguity. Although the Law Reform Commissions consultation does not examine the topic of dangerous offenders in depth, this paper may provide a useful guide if any such examination is undertaken in an Irish context in the future.
Key words: Criminal Justice Act; Law Reform Commision; Mandatory Sentencing policy, England; Wales
The criminal justice system has always been concerned with protecting members of the public from dangerous offenders (Clarkson: 1997; Dingwell: 1998), and a policy of public protection is both legitimate and beyond debate (Bartlett and Sandland: 2007). However, implementing any policy is never easy and the results always tend to be far from perfect (Gunn: 1978). A policy of protecting the public from dangerous offenders is no different, and there are several issues which need to be considered.
First of all, there must be a determination of what constitutes a dangerous offender, and what distinguishes them from a non-dangerous offender. What kind of behaviour makes an offender dangerous? Must an offender commit an act of violence in order to be considered dangerous? Are there varying degrees of dangerousness? Secondly there is an issue of rights - rights of both the offender and of society. The criminal justice system operates under the presumption of innocence, whereby a person is innocent until they are proven guilty. Surely this is in conflict with the notion that it is acceptable to incarcerate someone for fear of what they may do in the future. This raises the question: how can you accurately predict dangerousness?
And what of the rights of society - do we not have a right to be protected from someone who poses a threat to us? These two areas alone have provided years of debate and argument from academics, criminologists and politicians, and I will examine these positions over the course of this paper. To begin with the concept of dangerousness and the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act (2003) which deal with dangerous offenders will be considered. The terms “dangerous offenders” and “dangerousness” will be defined in both the context of the 2003 Act and in terms of the criminological research which has been carried out in this area. This paper will then consider the provisions of the 2003 Act which sets out the mandatory framework for the sentencing of dangerous offenders. There will also be an examination of the legislation preceding the 2003 Act as well as the reforms which were introduced in the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act (2008).
The arguments put forward which support and reject a sentencing policy based on the concept of dangerousness will be considered as will the morality and legality of such a sentencing policy. From a moral standpoint I will determine whether such a policy is morally right, while from a legal standpoint, I will determine whether the use of dangerousness in sentencing is compatible with human rights law by referring to the European Convention on Human Rights. The final section will provide an analysis of the arguments put forward over the course of this paper. I will examine the concept of dangerousness and the policy of preventive sentencing from a rights based perspective as well as from a criminological perspective. I will also examine crime statistics from both the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice which relate to a sentencing policy based on dangerousness.
1. What Constitutes a Dangerous Offender?
Various definitions of what constitutes a dangerous offender and dangerousness have been put forward in legal, academic and criminological settings. The Butler Report (1975) reported that dangerousness was “a propensity to cause serious physical or lasting psychological harm” (p. 59). The Scottish Council on Crime (1977) defined dangerousness as being “the probability that he (the offender) will commit serious and irredeemable personal injury in the future” (para. 122 as cited by Bottoms 1977 p. 74). Pratt (2000) suggested that dangerous offenders were, “That group of offenders whose propensity to repeatedly commit crimes of a non-capital but otherwise serious nature puts the well being of the rest of the community at risk” (p. 35). ccording to Floud (1982) “there is no such psychological or medical entity as a ‘dangerous’ person…Dangerousness is a thoroughly ambiguous concept” (pp.213-214). Walker (1982) notes that “dangerousness is both an “unscientific” and an “imprecise” term (p. 276). This creates a problem when it comes to defining exactly what constitutes a dangerous offender. An attempt to define a dangerous offender gives rise to a whole series of questions: should all offences be considered dangerous or just those which involve violence? How do we know if the offender will commit another crime? How many offences are necessary to distinguish dangerousness from bad luck? (Moore et al: 1984). Dangerousness, and the notion of defining dangerous offenders, would therefore appear to be an “imprecise, flexible and broad concept” (Bennett: 2007 p. 7) - one which is determined on a case by case basis and one which involves the measuring of risk of re-offending. According to Nash (2006), the risk is “the likelihood or probability that an event will happen, whereas dangerousness relates to the potential severity of that event” (p. 17).
It was not until the passing of the Criminal Justice Act (2003) that the term “dangerous offender” first appeared in a legislative context. Chapter 5 Part 12 of the Act is entitled “Dangerous Offenders”. The passing of the Act in 2005 introduced “an entirely new regime for the sentencing of offenders classified as dangerous” (Ashworth: 2010 p. 228). This new regime provided an appealing offer – “by permitting actions against what a defined group of ‘dangerous’ people may do in the future, we provide, in the present, security for our vulnerable citizens” (Henbenton and Seddon: 2009 p. 343). The classification of who actually constitutes a dangerous offender is contained in ss. 225-228 whereby “the court is of the opinion that there is significant risk to members of the public of serious harm occasioned by the commission of him of further specified offences.” The term “serious harm” is defined in s.224 as “death or serious personal injury, whether physical or psychological” (as per the Butler Committee), while the term “specified offences” is afforded a broad definition in Schedule 15 , whereby it may include offences such as assault occasioning bodily harm, violent disorder and affray. The term “significant risk” is not defined in the legislation and it has been left to the Courts to best decide what constitutes a significant risk on a case by case basis. In the case of R v Lang (2006 EWCA Crim. 2864) the Court of Appeal held that significant risk means “noteworthy, of considerable amount or importance”, while the “risk” must be to members of the public. This was reiterated in the case of Pedley, Martin and Hamadi (2009: EWCA Crim. 840) when it was stated that the term significant should be given its ordinary English meaning of “noteworthy” or “of considerable amount or importance”. For the purposes of this paper I will take the term “dangerous offender” to mean someone who has been convicted for an offence which caused serious harm (as per s. 224 of the 2003 Act) to another person, and who has been assessed by the Courts as likely to commit another offence causing serious harm. The term “dangerousness” can then be taken to be the traits within the individual which result in them committing further offences.
2. Criminal Justice Act (2003) - Mandatory Framework for Sentencing Dangerous Offenders
In order to fully understand the sentencing provisions of the Criminal Justice Act (2003) (as well as the amendments made in the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act (2008)), it is worthwhile to examine, albeit briefly, the sentencing provisions of the legislation which it replaced.
Criminal Justice Act (1991)
The Criminal Justice Act (1991) provided for an extension of sentence for violent and sexual offences.
Under Section 2(2) (b) of the Criminal Justice Act (1991), dangerous offenders who committed a sexual offence or an act of violence could now receive a longer custodial sentence than would be justified on the basis of proportionality, in order to protect the public from any future serious harm.
Crime (Sentences) Act (1997)
In 1997 the Crime (Sentences) Act was passed. The Act, described as both “repressive and severe” (Ashworth 2005 p. 207), introduced three mandatory minimum sentences. These were:
- The automatic life sentence.
- A minimum sentence of seven years imprisonment on a class A drug dealer who has two previous convictions for similar offences (Section 3).
- A minimum sentence of three years imprisonment on a domestic burglar aged at least 18 who has two previous convictions of domestic burglary, each after December 1 1999 (Section 4).
This Act essentially introduced a “two strike system”, whereby the conviction of a second serious offence resulted in a mandatory minimum sentence, unless there were “exceptional circumstances”. The Act seriously restricted judicial discretion in the sentencing process and despite being widely regarded as “the most profoundly unsatisfactory piece of populist sentencing legislation for many years” (Henham: 1998 p. 223), the incoming Labour government chose to adopt many of its provisions until it developed its own criminal justice legislation.
Criminal Justice Act (2003)
The Criminal Justice Act (2003) introduced a new regime for the sentencing of offenders who were deemed to be dangerous. The Act replaced automatic life sentences, longer than proportionate sentences for sexual and violent offenders, extended sentences and, to a large extent, the discretionary sentence of life imprisonment. Offenders who were deemed to be dangerous were now to be subjected to one of three levels of sentence – imprisonment for life, imprisonment for public protection, or an extended sentence (Ashworth:2005). The Act also introduced a mandatory framework for sentencing dangerous offenders - this was provided in the word “must” which was mentioned no less than fourteen times in Chapter 5 of Part 12 of the Act. The Act essentially politicised the sentencing process, as minimum terms of imprisonment were now being set by Parliament and not the Courts. Given that one of the aims of the Labour government was to “rebalance the criminal justice system in favour of the victim and the law abiding majority”1, perhaps this was inevitable. The sentencing provisions of the Act had many high profile critics. The mandatory sentencing guidelines were described as “grotesque” by the then Director of Public Prosecutions, Ken Macdonald, while Woolfe CJ described them as a “politicians knee jerk reaction.”2 Rose LJ, when sitting on the Court of Appeal, stated that provisions of the Act were “at best, obscure and, at worst, impenetrable” (R v Campbell  EWCA Crim. 726).
Imprisonment for Life
Section 225 of the Act applies to adults who have been convicted of a serious offence as defined by the Act. Upon conviction, they are liable to be detained either for life or for a period of indeterminate imprisonment for the purpose of public protection. Before invoking this power, the Court must be of the view that there is a significant risk to members of the public of serious harm occasioned by the commission, by him, of further specified offences. If this is the view of the Court, the life sentence must be imposed. Section 226 of the Act applies to minors. It mirrors S. 225 with the exception that prior to passing a sentence for public protection, the court must first consider whether an extended sentence would be adequate to protect the public. Only if such a sentence would be inadequate should a sentence under this section be imposed (Keogh 2004). Under S 226(2), if the Court is of the view that a sentence of detention for life should be imposed, it must be imposed.
Extended sentences are covered in s. 227 of the Act and they signify a sentence comprising an appropriate period of detention followed by an extended period of supervision in the community. This extended period is set by the Court at the time of sentence. Section 227 only applies to adults who are convicted of specified violent or sexual offences which do not fall under those offences which would attract a life sentence (Gibson: 2004). In such a case the court must impose an extended sentence
Section 228 of the Act mirrors the provision for minors with one important difference: while specified offences for adults must be dealt with under s. 225, in the case of minors “an extended sentence can be imposed for serious specified offences as an alternative to a detention for public protection, save where detention for life or for public protection is needed” (Keogh: 2004 p. 121). Again, if the Court is of the view that an extended sentence should be imposed, it must be imposed.
The extended sentence provided for a period above and beyond the original sentence handed down by the court. In such instances the court would now have to apply a commensurate sentence as punishment for the crime committed, as well an additional sentence which was required to protect the public from the dangerous offender and the harm that they may cause. This additional sentence is known as a “preventive sentence” and it lies at the heart of the argument of sentencing dangerous offenders based on the risk that they pose. I will consider this argument in section 3 of this paper.
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act (2008)
The Criminal Justice and Immigration Act (2008) introduced several reforms to the Criminal Justice Act (2003). In the area of sentencing the 2008 Act replaced the mandatory requirement to impose an indeterminate sentence for public protection with judicial discretion. This was subject to four conditions:
1. The individual must be convicted of a serious offence.
2. The court must be of the opinion that the offender is dangerous.
3. A sentence of life imprisonment is unavailable or unjustified.
4. The offender must have a previous conviction for an offence under Schedule 15 A.
In the field of extended sentences, the 2008 Act replaced the mandatory provision to impose an extended sentence with judicial discretion. Again, the restrictions as above were in place. Under s 229 (3) of the 2003 Act the court must assume that the offender poses a risk to the public if convicted of a “specified offence”, unless, having considered all the evidence, it would be deemed unreasonable to do so. The 2008 Act abolished this presumption of dangerousness.
3. Preventive Sentencing and the dangers of dangerousness
The fundamental argument for preventive sentencing of dangerous offenders is rooted in classical utilitarianism: the State must protect society from those who would seek to destroy it. Floud and Young (1982) recommended the following:
“The Crown Court should be empowered, for the protection of others against grave harm by an offender, to sentence him to imprisonment for a specified period greater than that which would ordinarily be specified, but proportional to the gravity of the anticipated harm and the courts estimate of the duration of the risk” (p. 155).
They justified this recommendation with several arguments, one of which was that it is rational: “If it is rational to decide the morality of punishing people for the harmful consequences of their past behaviour with reference to their intentions and motives and state of mind and circumstances, it cannot be irrational to take these considerations into account when deciding on the morality of preventing them from causing harm by their behaviour in the future” (p. 10).
They also formulated an approach which they claimed to be rights based in relation to incarceration for dangerousness. They pose a moral dilemma which offers a choice between alternative risks: the risk of harm to potential victims against the risk of unnecessarily detaining offenders who are judged to be dangerous. Under a due process model, an offender can only be convicted for the crime they have committed and the public must run the risk of being a victim of that crime. Under a crime control model, which is what Floud and Young seem to be advocating, there is a re-distribution of that risk in society. They state:
“There is a risk of harm to innocent persons at the hands of an offender who is judged likely to inflict it intentionally or recklessly…His being in the wrong by virtue of the risk he represents is what entitles us to consider imposing on him the risk of unnecessary measures to save the risk of harm to innocent victims” (p. 49).
This is a very hard line to take, and it is tantamount to sentencing someone for what they have not yet done. They also identify a problem with such a form of sentencing as they acknowledge that “mistakes are unavoidable” (p. 48).
While dangerousness in itself is not a crime of any sort, it runs the risk of endangering society at large. As a result of this risk, it is often argued that punishment is warranted (Bagaric: 2001). The preventive sentence may then be viewed as a “pre-emptive strike” (Morris: 1994 p. 238) against the offender. Gross (1981) has argued that preventive sentences are only justified for those who have already committed an offence. This is often referred to as a “trigger” - an event which justifies an action being taken. In this case, the commission of an offence is the trigger, and this results in the loss of an individual’s right to be presumed harmless by the State (Floud and Young 1981). According to Walker (1982), the major objection to preventive sentencing is that “incapacitation as a reason for penal interventions means that a person is punished, not for what he has done but for what it is believed he may do in the future” (p. 280). Any retributivist would hold this to be unacceptable as an offender cannot be punished for a crime that they have not committed, even if it is guaranteed that he will commit another crime in the future (Wood: 1988).
This presents the question of how can we accurately predict whether a person will commit a crime in the future. Statistical methods may be used whereby the criminal records of the offender are examined to determine if they present any future threat. Phillpotts and Lancucki (1979) found that from a sample of 5,000 offenders, 54% with three convictions for violence, and 85% with more than three convictions for violence, would be reconvicted of a further such offence within six years. However, this is a crude method of prediction as it fails to differentiate between different levels and types of crime. Therefore, to suggest that this will provide any degree of accuracy with regards to predicting future crimes is somewhat misguided.
Another method of identifying dangerous offenders would be to look at any clinical assessments which are available. This links closely to the association of dangerous offenders with mental illness. However, the relationship between mental disorder and criminality is an uncertain one and is highly problematic to research (Peay: 2002). While dangerousness is not an actual medical condition, predictability of violent crime does seem to rise with some mental disorder (Monahan: 2004). However, to test the accuracy of a clinician’s ability to predict dangerousness, an offender must first be released in spite of the risk that they may pose. According to Floud and Young (1982) this has resulted in inaccurate data obtained from skewed samples of inmates judged dangerous by clinicians but released by a court order.
The impossibility of predicting dangerousness will ultimately result in false positives and false negatives:
“A false positive is a case which a psychiatrist or other person falsely predicts will be violent when he will not, in fact be; a false negative is someone who has been released as safe, but who then commits seriously violent acts” (Bottoms: 1977 p. 76).
These false positives are ultimately the dangerous results from a sentencing policy based on dangerousness. Monahan (1976, as cited by Bottoms 1977) claims that the best which could be hoped for is a false positive rate of between 55 and 70%, and by going forward with such a policy “we must be prepared to lock up one or two persons who will not be violent for every “true positive” who we detain – and in the full knowledge that these non-violent persons will be held, probably, for long periods (Bottoms: 1977 p. 80). Our ability to accurately predict dangerousness is, at best, very poor (Black and Spinks: 1985; Butler Report: 1975). Research has emphasized “the difficulty, if not impossibility, of accurate predicting in this field” (Clarkson: 1997 p. 286), and even with the most accurate methods, “there can be no certainty in the prediction of human affairs” (Report of the Parole Board for 1969 as cited in the Butler Report 1975 p. 61). Currently there are “no reliable actuarial and statistical devices as yet that can predict with any degree of certainty the likelihood of dangerous behaviour” (Parke and Mason 1995 p. 322 as cited in Bagaric 2001 p. 208). However, even if there were such actuarial and statistical devices which could yield an accurate prediction rate of 100%, I would still argue that the preventive sentencing of offenders, based on the risk of what they may do in the future is morally wrong. I will now present my own arguments against a policy of preventive sentencing.
The concept of dangerousness goes to the heart of the philosophy of utilitarianism and this represents a major point of contention in the argument: how do we balance one set of rights against another? For example, which right should take precedence: my right not to be harmed by a dangerous offender or an offender’s right not to be deprived of their liberty for an act they have not yet committed? In this penultimate section I will argue that a policy of preventive sentencing is immoral from a rights based perspective, as well as being flawed from a criminological perspective.
A Rights based Perspective
Under Article 5 (4) of the European Convention on Human Rights, anyone whose liberty is deprived by detention “shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court.” According to Emerson and Ashworth (2001), “it is not sufficient that the detention was ordered by a court following conviction, if the reason for continued detention turns on characteristics of the offender that may change over time” (p. 488).
When considering the concept of disproportionate sentences as a human rights violation, Van Zyl Smit and Ashworth (2004) note that in various jurisdictions around the world, “it is a constitutional principle that no person should be subjected to a grossly disproportionate sentence” (p. 541). They quote from the case of S v Dodo ((3) SA 382 (CC) 303) where Ackerman J., speaking for the unanimous verdict of the Constitutional Court of South Africa stated:
“The concept of proportionality goes to the heart of the inquiry as to whether punishment is cruel, inhuman or degrading, particularly where, as here, it is almost exclusively the length of time for which an offender is sentenced that is in issue” (p. 541).
Van Zyl Smit and Ashworth (2004) also refer to the case of Offen (No. 2) (2001 (2) SACR (SCA)). In his ruling, Woolfe CJ drew upon the European Convention of Human Rights as part of his reasoning, when noting that “conviction of a serious offence could result from a mere push that causes a fatal head injury” (p. 552). It was stated:
“The offence was manslaughter. The offender may have committed another serious offence when a young man. A life sentence in such circumstances may well be arbitrary and disproportionate and contravene Article 5. It could also be a punishment which contravenes Article 3.”
According to Van Zyl Smit and Ashworth (2004), “this is clearly stating that disproportionate sentences constitute a violation of human rights” (p. 552).
When posing the question of “what rights do we have?” Dworkin (1977) refers to Jeremy Bentham who stated that “any law whatsoever is an ‘infraction’ on liberty” (p. 267). This is, in my view, a fair statement. After all, what is the law but a system of rule and guidelines of what is deemed to be acceptable and unacceptable behaviour in society. In its simplest form, the law tells us what we can and cannot do. However, while laws are an infraction on our liberty, we agree to this as part of the social contract we have with the State. We surrender certain freedoms to the State in return for its protection. For example, I have the right not to be a victim of violence. Should I be a victim, I surrender my right to seek vengeance to the State, who does it on my behalf through the criminal justice system. Without the social contract we would not have a system of laws and as a consequence we would have no notion of rights.
Personally I am of the view that preventive sentencing is morally wrong and that it is incompatible with our human rights. Of course there is the possibility that such sentencing will protect society from a future act of violence and public protection is important. However, are we as a society willing to lock up people for crimes that they have not yet, and in fact may never commit, all in the name of public protection? If so I believe that we could be on the first footing of a very slippery slope. My views on such a sentencing policy are summarized by Radzinowicz and Hood (1978) where they state that any sentencing policy based on dangerousness is “so insidious that is should never be introduced in penal legislation” (p. 722).
In conclusion, while I agree that public protection is a vital component of any responsible criminal justice policy, I would wholeheartedly agree with Ashworth (2004) who claims that it (public protection) “should not be considered in isolation from fundamental human rights” (p. 4).
A Criminological Perspective
From a criminological perspective there is little evidence which indicates that preventive sentencing, based on a determination of dangerousness, reduces crime or enhances public protection in any way. The following statistics support this claim.
During the period 2005 – 2007 the use of Indeterminate Sentences for Public Protection (IPP) increased by 300% due to the mandatory provisions of the 2003 Act. In 2005 the IPP’s were handed down in 426 cases. By 2007 the figure was 1,707. However, violent crime recorded by the police slightly increased over the same period, while the British Crime Survey reported no change. Therefore it is fair comment to say that the mandatory sentencing provisions did not reduce the crime rate.
After the reforms of the 2008 Act, the number of IPP’s in 2009 had fallen to approximately 1,000. However, even with this reduction in the use of IPP’s violent crime recorded by the police also fell (6%), while the British Crime Survey reported no change from the previous year. These statistics indicate that a system of mandatory sentencing provides no guarantee of reducing crime. It is also worth noting that for the period 2005 – 2010 the risk of being a victim of violent crime has remained constant between 3% - 3.5% which proves that public protection was not reduced by abolishing the mandatory requirements (Home Office 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010; Ministry of Justice 2007, 2008, 2009). According to Floud and Young (1981) “the preventive confinement of ‘dangerous’ offenders is only marginal value as a protective device” (p. 15).
Radzinowicz and Hood (1978, 1981), drew attention to the political abuse of the concept of dangerousness, whereby politicians could use this to play upon the fears of people. Bottoms and Brownsword (1982) referred to this as “the populist tendency” (p. 248). Such a tendency was apparent in the Floud Report which states that “fear turns risk into danger” (p. 4). This remains true today. According to Ashworth (2004), if the State focuses on ineffective policies, this could result in it being distracted from pursuing policies which may have a chance at actually preventing crime. Unfortunately this is a major problem when politicians’ get involved, as their primary concern is always for their seat. However, the Minister of Justice has recently stated that the Indeterminate Sentence for Public Protection (IPP) represents a ‘gross injustice’ and is a ‘bit of a stain on our system’ (Radio 4 Today Show, 27 October 2011).
Ashworth (2004) refers to Garland (2001), who states that we have now reached ‘the limits of the sovereign state’ and that governments now realise that they cannot control crime. Therefore they are adopting a series of policies which should prove politically popular while having no practical impact on crime. Garland refers to this as ‘criminology of the other’ - a policy which demonize the dangerous and persistent without acknowledging that such a policy is severely limited in what it can achieve (p.9).
It was once said that “those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety” (Jackson: 1759 p. 289). This statement, although made over 250 years ago, it still relevant in the context of the argument put forward in this paper. Over the course of this paper I have set out to explain exactly what the terms “dangerousness” and “dangerous offender” means. I have examined the sentencing provisions of the 2003Act, the legislative background to this Act, and the amendments as per the 2008 Act. Finally, I discussed the moral and criminological dilemmas of preventive sentencing for the purpose of dangerousness.
It is my view that to sentence someone based on what may occur in the future is morally wrong. Any such policy is, I believe, based in morally and criminological doubtful foundations. We live in a world where public protection is important - but not at the expense of our fundamental rights. Those rights include liberty and the presumption of innocence. To accept a sentencing policy based on the concept of dangerousness would be in conflict with those rights. Such a policy could lead us down a slippery slope. What could the concept of dangerousness evolve into? Could it evolve to include the thoughts inside your head, whereby we end up being involved in policing a form of pre-crime?
While such statements may sound far-fetched, and may belong in the realm of science fiction, a policy of sentencing for dangerousness, and thus for events which have not yet happened, is actually leading us down this road. We live in a world of twenty four hour media coverage which bombards us with a view of the world where crime is out of control and we all need to be on our guard. Garland (2001) argues that governments have reached a stage where they realise that they can no longer control crime. If this is true then and governments are simply maintaining an ineffective policy of crime control for the sake of optics, well then I feel that we should all be worried. Such a notion will simply divert resources away from other ideas which, although they may not be as politically popular, may actually stand a chance of reducing crime and having some positive impact on the world in which we live.
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